Multi-oracle interactive protocols with constant space verifiers  by Feige, Uriel & Shamir, Adi
JOURNAL OF COMPUTER AND SYSTEM SCIENCES 44, 259-211 (1992) 
Multi-oracle Interactive Protocols 
with Constant Space Verifiers 
URIEL FEIGE* AND ADI SHAMIR 
Department of Applied Mathematics, 
The Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot 76100, Israel 
Received October 1, 1989; revised January 5, 1991 
Multi-oracle interactive protocols are an extension of the Goldwasser-Micali-Rackoff 
model, in which several infinitely powerful provers interact with a single resource-bounded 
verifier. In this paper we consider the language recognition power of such protocols and prove 
that a tinite state verifier can accept any recursively enumerable set both in the multi-prover 
submodel of Ben-or, Goldwasser, Kilian, and Wigderson, and in the noisy oracle submodei 
of Feige, Shamir, and Tennenholtz. Unlike Lipton’s single prover construction, our simulation 
of arbitrary Turing machine computations uses only polynomial overhead and stops with 
probability 1 (whenever the Turing machine stops). By using the new tehniques, we show that 
computing the expected payoff of reasonable games of incomplete information is undecidable, 
thus solving a long-standing open problem posed by Reif. ii“ 1992 Academic Press, lot 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The notion of interactive proofs, introduced by Goldwasser, Micali, and 
Rackoff [lo] (IP) and by Babai [l] (AM), was generalized to models with many 
provers in two different ways: 
1. The multi-prover model (MIP model) of Ben-or, Goldwasser, Kilian, and 
Wigderson [3]. The proves cooperate with each other and either try to jointly help 
the verifier or to jointly mislead him. 
2. The noisy oracle model (NO model) of Feige, Shamir, and Tennenholtz 
[8]. The provers oppose each other, with at least one prover trying to help the 
verifier and the others trying to mislead him. 
In this paper we use the terms “oracle” and “prover” interchangeably. 
We investigate the language recognition power of constant space probabilistic 
verifiers in multi-oracle models. The power of space-bounded verifiers in single 
prover models has been extensively studied. Condon and Ladner [S] and Condon 
[4] give a general setting for studying the power of log-space verifiers in single 
prover models and show the counter intuitive result that languages in exp-time can 
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be accepted. Cordon and Lipton [6] prove an upper bound of nondeterministic 
triple-exponential time on the complexity of languages accepted by such systems. 
Simultaneous poly-time and log-space bounds on verifiers are studied by 
Fortnow [9], who shows that in case of public coins they can accept only 
languages in P, and by Rompel [is], who shows that in case of private coins this 
model is as strong as IP. Dwork and Sockmeyer [7] study the case of finite state 
verifiers. The zero knowledge aspects of space-bounded protocols (which are not 
discussed in this paper), are studied in [7] and by Kilian [13]. 
We know of no work investigating the power of space bounded verifiers in 
models with many provers. Still, work on games of incomplete information by John 
Reif [ 171 and work on “multiple-person alternation” by Peterson and Reif [lS] 
are relevant to our work, and their techniques serve as an excellent starting point 
for developing protocols in our models. 
Summary of our main results: 
l We construct a protocol by which a finite state verifier simulates a Turing 
machine (and thus tests any recursively enumerable statement), both in the 
opposing provers model and in the collaborating provers model. If any prover 
cheats during the simulation, the verifier detects this with high probability. 
Furthermore, the simulation stops with probability 1, unless the simulated Turing 
machine itself does not stop. 
l We show a connection with game theory, concluding that computing the 
payoff of optimal probabilistic strategies for reasonable two player games of incom- 
plete information is undecidable. This solves an open question raised by Reif [16] 
in 1979. 
l In the collaborating provers model, we show that a finite state verifier can 
verify in polynomial time any statement that a poly-time verifier can verify. 
Recently Lipton [ 14,6] constructed a protocol by which even a single prover 
can prove any r.e. statement to a finite state verifier, provided the soundness condi- 
tion is relaxed to allow cheating provers to extend the execution of the protocol 
indefinitely. This implies an alternative proof to some of the results in this paper, 
and, in particular, the undecidability result for the opposing provers model. 
However, statements which require time t(n) on a Turing machine require time 22’(“) 
in Lipton’s protocol, making it impossible to use Lipton’s protocol in order to 
derive our results on simultaneous time and space bounds. 
2. THE FORMAL MODEL AND TERMINOL~CY 
The verifier V is modeled as a probabilistic finite automaton (pfa). V has special 
send and receive states through which it communicates with the oracles. One pair 
of states is dedicated to each oracle, and V can send or receive only one character 
at a time. Thus V can communicate with each oracle in constant space, although 
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it cannot remember the complete history of the communication. In contrast, each 
oracle may remember the complete history of its own communication with I’, and 
use it in order to compute the next character it sends. 
Randomness is incorporated into V by having the transitions of V depend not 
only on the state of its finite control and on the characters accessed by its read 
heads, but on the result of a flip of an unbiased coin as well. 
The oracles may be either good or bad. Truthful oracles are modeled as 
computationally unbounded random interactive Turing machines. Cheating oracles 
are modeled as (possibly uncomputable) functions from the history of their 
communication with V to the next character they produce. V does not know a 
priori which are the good oracles and which are the bad ones. 
A protocol is said to be synchronous if V’s communications with the oracles 
occur at fixed points of time, with respect to some global clock. Otherwise, the 
protocol is said to be asynchronous. In asynchronous protocols, the oracles cannot 
derive any conclusions from the deay between successive attempts to access them. 
All the protocols we construct can be implemented in the synchronous model. 
The probability of success of a protocol is defined in a natural way over the 
random tosses of V’ and of the good oracles. The random string consumed 
represents a real number in the range [0, 11. Thus our probability space (Sz, F, P) 
is the following: 52 = [0, 11, F is the Bore1 a-field, P is the Lebesgue measure. Bad 
oracles do not toss coins. Instead they nondeterministically choose the function 
which gives them the best chance of cheating. 
If only one of the oracles is present, we have the IP model of GMR [lo] with 
space bounded verifiers. We denote this model as IP( 1 ), where the 1 stands for one 
prover. We are interested in cases where at least two oracles are present. We 
distinguish between two submodels: 
1. Multi-prover (Ben-or, Goldwasser, Kilian, and Wigderson 1131). The 
oracles collaborate in the sense that either all of them are good or all of them are 
bad. No oracle knows the communication of other oracles with V. We denote this 
model by IP ( /I ), where (1 stands for collaborating oracles. 
2. Noisy oracle (Feige, Shamir, and Tennenholtz [S]). The oracles oppose 
each other in the sense that at least one of them is good, and the others may be bad. 
V does not know which is the good oracle. No oracle knows the communication 
of other oracles with V. We denote this model by (IP)(x), where x stands for 
opposing oracles. 
We will in general consider cases where only two provers are present. It is a sim- 
ple matter to adapt our protocols to cases where there are more than two oracles. 
v’s goal is to verify membership of the common input x of length n in the language 
L. Two conditions must hold: 
1. Completeness. If x E L, the probability that I/ accepts is greater than $. 
(In the IP( (/ ) model this is required only if all oracles are good. In the IP(x) 
model, this is always required, as one oracle is always good.) 
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2. Soundness. If x4 L, then no matter what the strategy of the bad oracles 
is, the probability that V rejects is greater than 3. 
When we consider recursively enumerable languages, we have to allow for non- 
halting computations. In this case (and only in this case), we use the following 
relaxed soundness condition: If x $ L, then no matter what the strategy of the bad 
oracles is, the probability that V accepts is smaller than 4. 
3. SIMULATING A TURING MACHINE 
When dealing with time-bounded verifiers, the role of the oracles is to actively 
help the verifier save computation time (by suggesting good options when a non- 
deterministic choice is required, by given counterexamples to wrong conjectures the 
verifier has, etc.). The key to understanding models with space bounded verifiers is 
to realize that the verifier’s problem is not how to save time (which now he has 
plenty), but rather to provide him with space. In doing so, the oracles can assume 
a passive role of serving as work tapes. The verifier must be active in checking that 
the provers do their job correctly. Once storage s(n) is reliably implemented, the 
verifier can check the statements of space complexity s(n). 
In this section we show how a finite state verifier can use two oracles as a reliable 
one-way infinite work tape. V asks the provers to store values for him and can later 
retrieve these values. The storage is reliable in the sense that when V retrieves a 
value from the tape, he can detect with high probability whether this value is the 
value V he initially wrote, or whether the oracles changed this value without 
authorization. Furthermore, in case some mishandling of storage is encountered, V 
knows to which of the oracles to attribute the fault. This is a necessary requirement 
in the opposing provers model, because in this case the provers contradict each 
other to begin with, and so the fact that someone (without knowing who) mis- 
handles the storage does not really teach V anything new. 
We note that the finite control of any Turing machine can be encoded in the 
description of the finite state verifier. The location of the read/write head on 
the work tape can be encoded as a special symbol in the appropriate location 
on the work tape itself and can be detected by scanning the nonblank portion of 
the work tape. Thus once V has an infinite work tape, he obtains the full power of 
a Turing machine. 
Simple attempts to implement reliable storage fail. For example, V may try to 
store duplicate copies of each value, one with each prover. When V later retrieves 
the value, he checks that what the provers send match. This scheme offers V no 
advantages. In case of opposing provers, if a mismatch occurs, V does not know 
which one of the two provers cheated. In case of collaborating provers, nothing 
prevents them from deciding beforehand on a common policy of which values are 
to be changed and in what way. An equally naive scheme is to detect errors in 
retrieved values by using an error detecting code. This scheme would detect with 
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high probability that an indifferent oracle returns a wrong value. But we are dealing 
with powerful cheaters which can easily create false values that pass the error 
detecting tests. 
A storage policy which gives a partial solution to our problem is the following 
(adapted from Peterson and Reif [ 151): I/ keeps two copies of the infinite tape, one 
with P,, the other with P,. Any access to memory involves reading all contents of 
the tape from both provers and retrieving (or replacing in case of a write operation) 
the value which follows the special character used to designate the location of the 
read/write head. Before the protocol begins, V randomly and secretly chooses one 
of the following two policies: 
1. Check that both provers are giving the same values as contents of memory 
by alternating turns between them. 
2. Run P, one access to memory ahead of P,, again alternating turns 
between the provers. I/ checks that the contents of memory the provers send match, 
except for the last value which V wrote, which is updated with P, and not yet 
updated with Pz. (I/ always remembers in his finite memory what the last update 
was.) 
In order to cheat successfully, the provers must both cheat at the same time. 
Otherwise V detects a mismatch. But in order to synchronize the first attempt to 
cheat, the provers must guess whether one prover is running one access to memory 
ahead of the other or not. They have probability 4 of guessing wrong. 
The above idea has two drawbacks: 
1. The protocol detects cheating, but gives no indication as to which one of 
the two provers is cheating. Thus, it is worthless in the opposing provers model. 
2. The protocol is inherently asynchronous. If the provers have a 
synchronized clock, they can cheat. (E.g., start sending wrong values at noon.) 
THEOREM 3.1. Both in IP( I( ) and in IP(x), a probabilistic j?nite state uer$er can 
implement a one-way infinite work tape reliably. 
Proof In our construction V “signs” the contents of each cell on the work tape, 
so that a cheating oracle who tries to change the contents of a cell must produce 
a new “valid signature” as well. Cell contents are chained in order to prevent 
duplication or reordering of validly signed cells. In order to defy attempts by the 
infinitely powerful oracles to break the signature scheme, we make it secure in an 
information theoretic sense. This is achieved by dividing the signature between the 
two oracles, such that no single one of them has enough information in order to 
forge a signature. 
Let 0 be the alphabet of the infinite tape to be implemented, where (T includes the 
blank character b and a special character h to be placed on the current location of 
the read/write head. Denote the contents of the one-way infinite work tape by m, , 
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m2, m3, m4, etc., where mi E IS. Encode each character as an integer in the range 
[0, q- 11, where q is a large enough prime satisfying qa 161. 
V chooses secretly and independently three random integers: a, b, r0 E [0, q - 11. 
For each location i on the work tape, in addition to mi, l’ chooses a random value 
ri E [O, q - 1 ] and computes a signature si, where 
si=a.m,+b.rj+ri-, (modq). 
Each prover receives from V only some of the values, without seeing what the 
other prover receives. P, receives mi, ri, and si for all the odd i, P, receives them 
for all the even i. Thus P, holds m,, ri, si ; P2 holds m2, r2, s,; P, holds m3, r3, s3 
etc, and V holds a, b, rO. The computation of a signature involves a and b which 
are secretly held by V, rid, which was chosen randomly by V and held by the other 
prover, and ri which is chosen randomly by V and held by the current prover. 
In order to use his vurtual work tape, V scans its contents from left to right by 
asking the provers to send him each time the appropriate mi, ri, si values. V checks 
each time that the signatures are valid. If an invalid signature is detected, V declares 
the prover sending the signature as cheater. (Since ri- i was already verified against 
si-l, and since V himself supplies a and b, this implies that the received mi, ri, si 
are not the values that V originally sent to the prover.) Each time the contents of 
the work tape have to be updated, I/ chooses fresh values for all ri, including ro. 
A formal description of v’s algorithm follows. x +- % is used to denote that the 
value of x is randomly and uniformly selected as an integer in the range [0, q - 11. 
j is a variable which accepts the values 1 or 2. Thus the operation j := 3 -j switches 
its value from 1 to 2 and vice versa. Recall that b denotes the blank symbol and 
h the read/write head. 




send (m, r, S) to Pj 





m := next character from input tape 
Each prover stores the triplets (m, r, s) in the order in which he receives them. 
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receive (m, r, s) from P, 
m, := m; ri := r; si := s; 
if sj#a~mj+h~~j+r,~j(modq) 




ifrO = q then r,, := r 
else 
{ 
compute new value for m3- j from (mtmp, m3 
s=a.m+b.r+r,,(modq) 
send (m, r, s) to P,_ j 
(f m = h then stop 
1 
I’ mi) and store in m 
Each prover sends the triplets (m, r, s) in the order in which they are stored, and 
replaces the last values he sends by the new values that V sends him. 
CLAIM. The first attempt to cheat is detected by the verifier with probability 
(4 - 1 J/4. 
Proof: This proof involves two simple steps: 
1. All values that P, (PI, respectively) receive are independent of a, b: 
(a) m,-Derived from the computation. 
(b) r,-Chosen at random in the range [0, q - 11. 
(c) si-In one-to-one correspondence with rip ,, which was chosen at 
random. 
Thus neither P, nor P, know anything about a or b. 
2. Assume that the first attempt to cheat involved cell i held by P,. Thus V 
gave P, the values mi, ri, and sj, and P, later sent V the values Mi, Ri, and Si, at 
least one of which is different from the original value. If the cheating is not caught, 
the following equation must hold: 
Sj=a.Mi+b.Ri+r,_, (modq). 
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In addition we know that 
si=a.mi+b.ri+ri-, (modq). 
Subtracting the two equations we obtain the following nontrivial relation between 
a and b: 
(Si-si)=(Mi-mi).a+(Ri-ri).b (modq). 
As q is prime, exactly q pairs (a, b) satisfy any nontrivial linear equation. But there 
are q2 possible pairs (a, b). So the probability that P, who is ignorant of the values 
of (a, b) will cheat and still pass the signature test is only l/q. 
This completes the proof of the claim and the proof of the theorem follows. 1 
Now that we know how to implement infinite work-tapes reliably, it is not 
difficult to prove the following theorem. 
THEOREM 3.2. Any r.e. language has both IP(x) interactive proofs and IP( 1) ) 
interactive proofs where the verifier is a pfa. 
Proof: Let L be an r.e. language and let T be the deterministic Turing machine 
accepting L. In order to verify that input x is in L, V simulates T’s computation on 
x. T’s finite control can be encoded into I’. By Theorem 3.1, using two provers V 
can implement work tapes with controllable probability of error (l/q). If no error 
is detected and V’s simulation of T’s computation leads to T accepting x, V accepts 
X. If an error is detected, then V declares the prover responsible for the error as 
cheater. In the IP(x) model, this leads to acceptance of the claim of the other 
prover. In the IP( (I ) model, this leads to rejection of both provers. 1 
The converse of the above theorem is also true. 
OBSERVATION 3.3. Testing whether a pfa oerifier accepts input x in an IP(x) or 
IP( I( ) proof system is in r.e. 
Proof. Given input x, we want to know if I/ accepts x. If I’ does accept x, there 
is some time threshold t by which V has accumulated probability greater than i of 
accepting x. 
In IP(x) it is sufficient to guess the probabilistic Turing machine implementing the 
optimal good prover and to guess t. Now one has to try out all possible functions 
of how the bad prover replies to each possible history shorter than t and check that, 
for each one, the probability of V accepting, taken over the tosses of V and the 
good prover, is greater than 4. 
In IP( 11 ) model, the optimal provers are deterministic. Thus it is sufficient to 
nondeterministically guess t and two functions of how each prover replies to each 
possible history shorter than t and to check over all sequences of v’s coin tosses 
shorter than t that V has probability greater than f of accepting. 1 
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If the simulated Turing machine T does not halt on input x, then V does not halt 
on x either. This is unavoidable, because if V did halt and reject all inputs that T 
does not halt on, then techniques similar to those of the proof of Observation 3.3 
would imply a recursive decision procedure for the hdting problem. But if T does 
halt on input X, it is desirable that V halt as well. With the protocols presented 
above, this is not the case. A cheating prover has small probability l/q of success- 
fully diverting V’s simulation to a nonhalting computation of T, and so V might 
not halt even though T does. It is possible to modify our protocol so that V halts 
with probability 1 on any input on which T halts. (This proof technique was 
independently discovered by Condon and Lipton [6].) 
THEOREM 3.4. Any recursive language has both IP( (1 ) and IP(x) verification 
systems where the verfier is a pfa which stops with probability 1. 
Proof: As in Theorem 3.2, the verifier simulates the computation of T. In order 
to stop, the verifier tosses a coin after each step he makes. If the coin comes up 
“heads,” the verifier continues with the simulation. If the coin comes up “tails,” the 
verifier aborts the current run and restarts the protocol from the beginning (with 
new random and independent a, b, and r,J. 
With probability 1, any infinite sequence of coin tosses contains infinitely many 
long enough sequences of “heads” which can bring the protocol to its completion. 
If a prover tries to bring about an infinite computation, he must cheat every time 
this happens (otherwise V stops because T stops). The probability of not being 
caught in infinitely many independent attempts to cheat is 0. 1 
Note that we pay a high price for stopping with probability 1: 
1. The expected running time of the protocol is exponentially higher than the 
running time of T. 
2. The original protocols could be implemented with a one-way probabilistic 
finite automaton. It was sufficient that the verifier go over the input tape just once 
and copy its contents to the virtual work tape. But now, when we need the 
possibility to restrat the protocol, the verifier must have a two-way read head on 
its input tape. 
Both problems can be avoided in the opposing provers model. In this case, 
whenever the protocol exceeds the number of steps necessary to simulate T, the 
good prover can deliberately stop the protocol (and get blamed by V as a cheater). 
This is justified because the event that the protocol runs for too long without a lie 
being detected has small probability, which does not significantly lower the good 
prover’s probability of winning. 
4. GAMES OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION 
In this section we describe an interesting application of our result on the power 
of IP(x) to game theory. This section does not deal with the IP( 11 ) model. 
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LEMMA 4.1. Even a finite state verifier who cannot toss coins can verifv any r.e. 
statement (provided the good prover can toss coins). 
ProoJ: The verifier’s protocol uses random numbers in the range 0 to q - 1. 
These numbers can be generated by asking each prover for a secret random num- 
ber, and adding the two replies module q. Because at least one of the provers is 
good, the resulting number will be random, and the bad prover cannot know what 
its value is. 1 
Our treatment of the verification system viewed the verifier as the active center 
of the system, and used provers only as memory. A complementary view is one in 
which the provers are two players actively playing a game, and the verifier is the 
passive “board” on which the game is played. The local state of the verifier serves 
as the position of the game. The messages the provers send serve as their moves. 
The transition table of the verifier as a deterministic finite automaton together with 
the contents of the input tape serve as the function computing the new position 
resulting from the previous position and the last move. The game is of imperfect 
information in the sense that the communication is secret, and the players (provers) 
cannot see the whole position (messages of the other prover). The game is 
“reasonable” in the sense that the size of the board (i.e., the memory of the verifier) 
does not change during the game. A strategy for a player is a (probabilistic) func- 
tion from the observable history of a game to his next move. For exact definitions 
of the above terms see [17]. 
In [16, 173, Reif studies such reasonable games of incomplete information. He 
shows that determining whether one of the players has a strategy that always wins 
is complete for exp-exp-time. An open question raised in [16] is to determine the 
complexity of deciding whether a player’s probability of winning with the optimal 
strategy is exactly $. There are many possible modifications to this problem. For 
example: Deciding whether the probability of winning is greater than $; deciding 
whether the probability of not losing is smaller than 4 (a player does not lose if 
either he wins or the game does not end); approximating the winning probability 
to within a fixed error; finding the best move in a given position; etc. The following 
corollary (with slight modifications) is robust enough to hold with respect to any 
of the above definitions. 
COROLLARY 4.2. The question whether player, has a probabilistic strategy which 
wins with probability > 4 in a reasonable game of imperfect information is 
undecidable. 
Proof: As we saw in Theorem 3.2, for any r.e. language L one can build a 
system where V accepts x (player,, claiming x E L, wins with high probability) if 
and only if XE L. Thus determining whether player, has a strategy which is 
expected to win is equivalent to determining whether XE L. 1 
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5. SIMULTANEOUS SPACE AND TIME BOUNDS 
In Section 3 we proved that a constant space (pfa) verifier can simulate a Turing 
machine. In this section we show how a constant space verifier can simulate 
another verifier which is not space bounded. Doing this may seem pointless, as a 
constant space verifier is as strong as a Turing machine, and an unbounded space 
verifier cannot be stronger. But the point is that when a Turing machine simulates 
an interactive proof, there is an exponential overhead in time, and so simulating an 
unbounded space verifier by a constant space verifier via a Turing machine is 
expensive. In this section we describe a direct simulation which has only polynomial 
overhead. This will allow us to transform results concerning poly-time verifiers to 
systems where the verifier has simultaneous poly-time and constant space bounds. 
Consider a poly-time verifier VP,,,,,. It has an input tape, a polynomial size work 
tape, access to random bits, and access to two oracles. If we want to simulate 
V pOIY’s computation using V which has only constant space, all we have to do is 
simulate the work tape. All the rest (input tape, random bits, and two oracles) V 
already has. In Theorem 3.1, we saw how a work tape can be simulated using two 
oracles. This simulation has only polynomial overhead (at most the square of the 
computation time). The problem is that in this simulation the oracles are aware of 
the contents of the work tape being simulated, and so they become aware of VpOlj’s 
state. This implies that this simulation works only in cases where the original 
protocol run by VpOIY makes no use of secret randomness. 
COROLLARY 5.1. In IP(x), a pfa verifier can verifil any P-space language, and do 
so in polynomial time. 
Proof. In [8 J a protocol is given by which a poly-time verifier can test any 
P-space assertion. In this protocol all communication is public, and V need not toss 
coins. By the discussion above, this protocol can be simulated by a constant space 
verifier in polynomial time. u 
A natural parallel to Corollary 5.1 is that in IP( I( ), a pfa verifier can accept in 
polynomial time any language in IP( 1 ). This can be proved through the equiv- 
alence of public coins and private coins for IP( I ) [ 111. But in fact, this result can 
be strenthened. 
THEOREM 5.2. In IP( ]I ), a constant space verifier can accept in polynomial time 
any language that an unbounded space verifier can accept in polynomial time. 
Remark. In case an oracle is cheating, V rejects with high probability in polyno- 
mial time, but there is some small probability that V does not stop in polynomial 
time (or that V accepts incorrectly). 
Proof. In [3] it is shown that a poly-time verifier with two provers can simulate 
a system with any number of provers. It is important to note that this simulation 
can be done by a synchronous verifier. That is, the exact points in time at which the 
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verifier sends messages to the two provers are fixed before the protocol begins and 
do not depend on contents of messages from the provers, or on the verifier’s secret 
coin tosses. So in order to prove Theorem 5.2, it remains to prove the following 
lemma. 
LEMMA 5.3. Both in the IP( (/ ) model, and in the IP(x) model, a pfa ver$er can 
verify in polynomial time any statement that a synchronous poly-time verifier (which 
has no space limitations) can. 
Proof: Consider a verification system with synchronous poly-time verifier V,. 
We lirst construct a new verifier V, which follows the same protocol as V,, but has 
only one work tape (see [12]). Furthermore, with each access to the work tape V2 
makes, we extend the nonblank portion of the tape one cell to the right, either as 
a natural consequence of 1/2’s computation, or artificially with a “pseudo-blank” 
character. This is done in order to ensure that no information about V2’s computa- 
tion (other than the number of computation steps made) can be derived by 
knowing the length of the nonblank portion of V;s work tape. Next, we break each 
cell in Vz’s work tape in two: An odd location and an even location. The value 
stored in the odd location is chosen at random, with uniform distribution over the 
values 0 to q - 1, where each random choice is made independently. The value 
stored in the even location is computed so that the sum modulo q of the odd and 
even location gives the correct value of the cell. Thus, V, can still use his work tape, 
but anyone observing either only odd locations or only even locations on the work 
tape can learn nothing about VI’s computation. Now we replace V2 by the pfa V 
and use the construction of Theorem 3.1 in order to simulate Vz’s work tape. By 
this construction one oracle holds the contents of even locations on the work tape, 
and the other oracle holds the contents of the odd locations. V simulates VI’s part 
in the protocol, and whenever Vz’s protocol calls for addressing one of the oracles, 
V does so. The construction guarantees that the oracles cannot gain information 
about Vz’s state in order to send I/ messages different from those that they would 
send V,. (This is where we used the fact that V, is synchronous. The fact that the 
oracles can count how many computation steps V makes up to the time they have 
to send a message does not teach them anything they did not know beforehand.) 
Thus V simulates Vi, except when cheating is detected (in which case V rejects the 
cheating oracle). 1 
Using Lemma 5.3 and the discussion preceding it, this completes the proof of 
Theorem 5.2. 1 
A recent result of Babai, Fortnow, and Lund [2] shows that nondeterministic 
exponential time languages can be verified by a polynomial time verifier in the 
collaborating provers model. Combining this with Theorem 5.2 we obtain: 
COROLLARY 5.4. In IP( 1) ), a constant space verifier can accept in polynomial 
time any nondeterministic exponential time language. 
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